matically so . Our data did not support the wellentrenched practice of monitoring all patients adm itted with this diagnosis in the unit for a minimum of 3 days. Our careful documen tation of clinical experience in our institution allowed us to break ranks and develop a more flexible approach. Others followed. In this particu lar case, the power of the end results collected for fewer than 400 pa tients with suspected myocardial infarction was enormous, changing clinical care for hundreds of thousands of patients admitted annually to hospitals across the United States. The disproportionate impact could not be explained by unassailable evidence produced by rigorous re search, but rather by the pre-existing vacuum. There was no objective evidence to support the earlier practice. That such a vacuum exists for many practices has been increasingly recognized (Eddy and Billings 1988) .
The database ultimately spawned nearly a dozen publications and, in that narrow sense, would have to be considered a success. But the evident impact on clinical practice just cited was the exception rather than the rule. In part, because what began as a simple idea became in credibly complicated as we and other investigators wrestled with ques tions of severity and comorbidity adjustment, and the validation of clinical prediction models necessary to make past experience useful for future decision making. A tension emerged between methodologic rigor and feasibility. Though constructive in the long run, this force would often draw energy and effort away from what was most clinicaUy relevant. Furthermore, when we tried to inform clinical decisions by narrowing confidence intervals around probabilities, we ran headlong into the realization that many if not most of the decisions were far more sensitive to the highly variable value judgments that had to be rendered about outcomes than to the probabilities of those outcomes, at least within the limits of our powers to predict. This was particularly problematic in the intensive care setting because of the life and death character of the decisions and the pace of decision making. Societal val ues play a more prominent role-along with those of patients, family members, and physicians-than in other care settings.
More recently, I have been involved with outcomes research with a geographic population base rather than a hospital base. My colleagues and I have focused on outcomes associated with benign prostatic hyper trophy and the decision of whether or not to undergo prostatectomy.
We began with an end results orientation that would please E.A. Codman. In addition to analyses of over 16,000 Medicare claims to provide less-biased estimates of objective outcomes, such as operative mortality, we conducted a survey of more than 400 patients before and after, at three monthly intervals, their surgical procedure (Wennberg et al. 1987; . The interviews allowed us to determine ex pectations and outcomes as well as to explore differences in patients' value judgments or utilities. We used this outcome data to construct a decision-analysis model and identify the key probabilities and their im portance in decision making relative to the key value judgments that should be made by patients . We are now involved in a project designed to organize and deliver the information about probabilities and about utilities to the different stakeholders-patients, clinicians, and societal agents involved in decisions about prostatec tomy-in a manner that will facilitate outcomes research designed to improve continuously the information base for future decisions (Wenn berg et al. 1988) . Now, back to the questions about Codman's frustration. Why was such a simple idea so strongly resisted? An answer might be that it was not so simple. Codman wanted to inform decisions and thereby im prove the efficacy of medical care. However, outcome information is a necessary but not sufficient element in any strategy to improve decision making.
A more complete strategy would include steps to improve access to, and organization of, available knowledge and to help clinical decision makers avoid errors in reasoning and logic that reflect unwitting devia tions from the axioms of rational decision making. While limited ra tionality of decision making can be documented in many disciplines, few professionals make decisions that so profoundly affect the quantity and quality of life as do physicians. More self-conscious examination of the way doctors manage information and make decisions should be come a focus for educational reform in medical schools and in clinical practice.
A complete strategy would also include steps to ensure a decision process that paid due respect to both the importance of individual pa tients' preferences and to societal interests that justify, depending on circumstances, either promotion or constraint of clinicians' and pa tients' decision-making autonomy. Any such strategy must recognize that the complexity is increased by the necessary sharing of clinical decision-making responsibility among clinicians, patients, and policy makers who act as societal agents (Mulley 1989b) .
Consider the contrast between E.A. Codman's single-minded obses sion with end results and the far more subtle interplay among stmcture, process, and outcome -or even the concentric circles of the bull's-eye -that Dr. Donabedian has used to distinguish not only levels at which quality of care may be assessed, but also the loci of responsi bility for decision m aking and care that produce health outcomes (Donabedian 1988 ).
Codman's single-mindedness may simply reflect the fact that the re sistance of his colleagues-after all, knowledge is power and power threatens -never allowed him to get past first base. We can blame the failure in his story on the recalcitrance and self-interest of his contem poraries as well as on his more than occasional tacdessness and quixotic character. But I suggest that as we embrace outcomes research, and try to convert new information to better clinical and policy decisions, we think carefully about the complexity of the task. We need to define better the difficult rational agency role of the clinician to provide the patient with information and vicarious experience about outcomes so that informed value judgments can complement informed probability estimates. We need more effective means to detect differences, and help patients recognize differences, in their wants and needs and atti tudes toward risk (Mulley 1989a) . We need to communicate outcome information to policy makers with a clear distinction between matters of fact and matters of value, so that at least we can better understand any basis for consensus or the lack of it (Mulley and Eagle 1988) .
If, as we gather information about outcomes, we clearly recognize the complexity of decision m aking-decision making necessarily shared by those with different perspectives and different values-we may be better equipped to realize more fully the potential of the simple idea of E.A. Codman and provide the vindication that was so important to him.
